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“The software did exactly what it was told to do. The 
reason it failed is that it was told to do the wrong 
thing.”
- The Coming Software Apocalypse, The Atlantic (Sept 2017)
• Discuss the Genesis Accident as Lesson Learned 
Case Study
• Explain how errors can find their way through a 
program with a test plan that lacks an integrated 
test (i.e. testing as you fly).
• Demonstrate the benefits of performing an 
integrated test 
Agenda
Known Polarity/Phasing Related Errors in Space Systems
System Date Error Impact Integrated
test?
Chandra X-ray 
Telescope
1999 Sun sensor phasing error caught in 
post-integration testing.
Fixed prior to flight.
Apollo LM Ca. 1968 ICD and simulator models 
incorrect, driving descent engine 
gimbals in wrong direction.
Fixed prior to flight. Yes
Delta Clipper 
(DCX)
1993 Sign error in control loop caught 
during integrated closed-loop 
suspended pendulum test.
Fixed prior to flight. Yes
Galileo 
Spacecraft 
Probe
1995 High G and low G g-switches
cross-wired. 
Parachute deployed at 
wrong altitude but 
mission still successful. 
TOMS-EP 1996 Sun sensors cross-wired. Polarity 
on magneto-torquers reversed. 
Fixed in software after 
launch.
TIMED 2001 Sun sensors were mounted 90 
degrees off. Polarity on magneto-
torquers reversed. 
Fixed in software after 
launch.
Genesis 2004 G-switch installed backwards due 
to design error.  Centrifuge test 
cancelled in favor of inspection.
Parachute failed to 
deploy. Spacecraft was 
destroyed.
TERRIERS 1999 Sign flip in magneto-torquer
command due to unknown cause.
Spacecraft lost.
Proton 2013 Yaw rate gyro was installed 
incorrectly. 
Crashed near launch 
pad.
Eight known US errors in recent 
history (since 1986) out of less than 
1000 launches (Greater than 1 in 
125). 
Proton 2013 Failure
Agenda
• Genesis was the fifth in NASA’s series of Discovery missions, and the first U.S. mission since Apollo to return extraterrestrial
material to Earth for study. 
• The purpose of the mission was to collect samples of solar wind and return them to Earth. 
• Launched August 8, 2001, Genesis was positioned approximately one million miles from the Earth orbiting the Earth-Sun 
libration point L1 which is outside Earth’s magnetosphere. 
• It remained in a libration point orbit for 28 months. The capsule lid was closed on April 1, 2004 and the spacecraft 
returned for a daytime Earth entry.
• On September 8, 2004, entry occurred on time and at the nominal location to support a landing as designed.
• Operation of the spacecraft appeared nominal until the expected deployment of the drogue parachute at approximately 
108,000 ft (33 km) altitude. No drogue or parachute was observed, and the SRC impacted the desert floor at 9:58:52 
MDT.
Intended Outcome Actual Outcome
• Investigation into the accident determined that the Genesis Project had a 
number of interrelated issues that led to the inversion of the G-switch sensors 
(the proximate cause that resulted in the drogue parachute deployment 
mishap). 
• Equipment used on the Genesis project was based on heritage equipment, but 
during development, it was recognized that more functionality was required than 
was available from the heritage equipment, upon which its proposed design had 
been based, thus requiring adjustments to the design. 
• As part of the redesign, the G-switch sensor was also moved from the timer card to 
the relay card, since it was mounted on shock isolators and would help avoid an 
unintended triggering due to buffeting during the early entry or inadvertent shifting of 
the relay positions which concerned the designers.
• The new design was recognized as a break with the heritage design, but this was 
not effectively communicated through the project personnel. Many engineers 
believed that the pyro initiation aspects of the design maintained their heritage. 
Genesis Accident – Sequence of Events
• Root cause analysis identified the following items leading to accident:
• Genesis Project Management and Systems Engineering did not perform due diligence with regard to reviewing briefing 
materials.
• A centrifuge test to verify the directionality of the G-switch sensors had been planned, but was deleted in favor of drawing inspections. 
• The only documentation indicating that Genesis Project Management or Systems Engineering had been informed of a centrifuge test 
deletion was a single bullet presented at two management reviews that read, “SRC AU 3-g test approach validated; moved to unit test; 
separate test not required.”
• Project Management and Systems Engineering believed that a quick-lift test had functionally and adequately replaced the centrifuge test. 
• No one above the SRC-AU Team reviewed the test plan or results, which contributed to the belief that the quick-lift test had functionally replaced the 
centrifuge test. This was because Systems Engineering was not required to review subsystem test procedures or verification results.
• No documentation of the change in verification methods was generated in the form of a Change Request or Technical Memorandum. Had this been 
done it would have resulted in a critical assessment of the change.
• No one recalled any discussion occurring regarding the bullet.
• Project Management and Systems Engineering assumed that a functional replacement for a centrifuge test was to occur that would 
determine G-switch sensor orientation.
Lessons Learned
• The acceleration is generated by the rotary motion of a 
cantilever arm. The test object is installed on the mounting 
table at one end of the arm, and the acceleration of the test 
object is controlled by the rotating speed.
• The measurement signals are monitored and recorded in the 
measurement room via measurement rack at the center of the 
rotation.
• Root cause analysis identified the following among the items leading to 
accident:
• Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) philosophy: Cost-capped mission with threat of 
cancellation if overrun.
• As proposed, selected, and confirmed on Genesis, the FBC philosophy had the following 
effects:
1.Maximal science scope and focus on payload issues at the expense of the spacecraft, SRC, and 
ground systems.
2.Low schedule and dollar reserves leading to significant adverse pressure on decision making.
3.Focus on a low-risk implementation led to a reliance on heritage hardware which gave a false sense 
that mission risk was controlled and allowed the risks associated with the lower standards for heritage 
to go unrecognized.
4.Very lean Systems Engineering team with heavy un-checked reliance on the subsystems teams for 
requirements and verification functions.
Lessons Learned (cont.)
• The risk of human error is one of the primary risk drivers in any aerospace 
program.  As a result, testing is in place that serves to catch these errors and 
rectify them prior to an accident occurring. 
• However, developing any integrated system requires individuals from different 
individuals and/or organizations to collaborate. As a result, a lack of specification 
in procedures during development can result in a misinterpretation that leads to 
an error occurring.
Estimating Risk from Human Errors
• The human failures are evaluated at a 
qualitative level first to determine likelihood.  
For events that don’t screen, they are 
subjected to detailed quantitative analysis 
using the SPAR-H (Standardized Plant 
Analysis Risk Model Human Reliability 
Analysis [HRA]) method.
• The SPAR-H method was utilized to develop 
an Human Error Probability (HEP) for each 
HFE.
• SPAR-H analyzes characteristics (Performance 
Shaping Factors [PSFs]) that affect an individuals 
ability to make a decision.
• PSFs represent multiplying factors that are 
applied on baseline HEP value (1E-03).
Human Failure Event (HFE) Development
Performance Shaping 
Factors
PSF Level Multiplier
Cognitive/Execution Execution 1.00E-03
Available Time Nominal 1
Stress Nominal 1
Complexity High 5
Experience/Training Nominal 1
Procedures Nominal 1
Ergonomics/HMI Good 0.5
Fitness for Duty Nominal 1
Work Processes Nominal 1
HEP - 2.50E-03
Sample HFE Quantification
• Testing or checks can serve as recovery actions to reduce the likelihood of an error 
occurring. 
• A recovery action is defined as an action performed by personnel that serves to 
prevent or mitigate an error.
• Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods (i.e. SPAR-H) are used in a similar 
manner to modeling a regular HFE.
• The event consists of two distinct phases: 1) diagnosis/cognitive phase, and 2) 
execution
• An integrated test would serve as a check, not only on the human actions to ensure 
they were performed correctly, but on the entire system to check that the 
components are functioning accordingly.
Recovery Actions – Benefits of an Integrated Test
• The following illustration demonstrates the effect of a recovery action on system risk with two cases. 
• The one on the left represents a case with no recovery action in place.
• The example on the right includes the recovery action to demonstrate the effect. 
Case 1 (w/ No Recovery Action): Case 2 (w/ Recovery Action): 
Risk = 1.0E-03 (1 in 1000) Risk = 1.0E-3 x 1E-02 = 1.0E-05 (1 in 100,000)
Recovery Actions – Benefits of an Integrated Test (cont.)
• The increase in complexity of systems and multiple 
individuals/organizations collaborating presents opportunities for 
additional errors to occur in the integrated design.
• Confidence in heritage design or budgetary and/or schedule pressures present 
challenges that can result in eliminating or reducing critical testing.
• Performing an integrated test or “testing as you fly” adheres to best 
practices as shown by past programs and current spacecraft and 
launch vehicles.
• Effective testing can result in a significant risk reduction of the design by orders 
of magnitude.
• An integrated test eliminates gaps in a testing program that only tests 
components individually or when a subset of components in an integrated 
design.
Summary
